Jarvis Clark Maycock v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Jarvis Clark Maycock v. State of Utah : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Barney Madsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for the state.
Stanley S. Adams; Attorney for Appellant/Defendant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jarvis Clark Maycock v. State of Utah, No. 950661 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6896
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JARVIS CLARK MAYCOCK, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Apcellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLLANT 
Case No. 950661-CA 
Argument Priority Number: 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
HONORABLE JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
carney Madsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South Suite 600 
P.O. Box # 14085 4 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411.1 
Attorn'. 
UTAH 
« • • • 
i 
OOCKET NO. jS^TblljP UI~£Jk 
Stanley S. Adams (#0020) 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
370 East So. Temple, # 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4111 
Telephone: (801) 35 9-0052 
At to rney / f• : i: 1 1] : I lay :ock . •• .. 
FILED 
JAN 2 2 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JARVIS CLARK MAYCOCK, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLLANT 
Case No. 950661-CA 
Argument Priority Number: 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
HONORABLE JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
Barney Madsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South Suite 600 
P.O. Box # 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stanley S. Adams (#0020) 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
370 East So. Temple, # 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0052 
Attorney for the state Attorney for Mr.Maycock 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SWAIN LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO SEARCH BECAUSE THE VEHICLE DID 
NOT CONTAIN MARIJUANA AS ALLEGED BY THE 
OFFICER AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS SITUATION 7 
POINT II. THE SEARCH WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE NO EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH 15 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 19 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 20 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Pages 
CASES CITED: 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, (1987) 15 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, (1971) 8 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, (1984) 14 
People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal.1968) 11 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) 15 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 9 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) ...7,16 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) 15 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 16,17 
i 
State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992) 9 
State v. Palmer, 676 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. APP. 1990) ..19 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988)... 15 
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) 18 
United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1993)..14 
United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986) 9 
United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1992) 15 
United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).10,11 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, (1949) 10 
STATUTES CITED: 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1 section 14 16,19 
ii 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV...6,7,8,10,12,16,19 
Utah Code Ann. 41-la-404 13 
Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1101 12 
Utah Code Ann. 44-6-44 2,3 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37a-5 2,3 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) 2,3 
Utah code Ann. 77-23-4 (2) 17 
Utah Code Ann. 77-23-204 18 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (f) 1 
THERE ARE NO PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
iii 
Stanley S. Adams #0020 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
370 East So. Temple # 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0052 
Fax: (801) 359-0053 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JARVIS CLARK MAYCOCK, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT 
Case No. 950661-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(f) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal, which appeal is from the final 
order of the Fourth Judicial District, Juab County, State of Utah 
entered on September 12, 1995. Counsel for Mr. Maycock filed a 
timely notice of appeal on 10th, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1, Did the officer who claimed to have smelled an odor of 
burnt marijuana but actually found no marijuana lack probable 
cause\reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to search 
appellant's vehicle or will the inevitable discovery doctrine 
allow admission of the evidence? 
2. Did exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless 
search as required by the Utah and United States Constitutions? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 25th, 1994, the State of Utah charged Maycock in 
a three count indictment alleging as Count I, a violation of 
Utah's Controlled Substance Act by knowingly possessing 
methamphetamine contrary to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (I), 
1953. Maycock was also charged with Count II, driving under the 
influence of drugs contrary to Utah Code Ann. 44-6-44, 1953 and 
Count III, possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to Utah Code 
Ann. 58-37a-5, 1953. Count II was dismissed prior to trial. 
Thereafter, at trial on June 26, 1995, Maycock made a motion 
to suppress evidence. The motion was denied. On July 16, 1995, 
Maycock was found guilty by a jury of Counts I and III as listed 
above. 
Preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress, Maycock was sentenced on Count I to the 
2 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate amount of time not to 
exceed five (5) years, plus pay a fine in the amount of $5,000 
and on Count III to the Juab County Jail for six (6) months. 
Execution of the sentence was suspended and Maycock was placed on 
probation for a period of 36 months subject to certain terms and 
conditions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 24th, 1992, Maycock was arrested during a 
traffic stop by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Fred Swain ("Swain"). 
He was subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine in 
violation of Utah's Controlled Substance Act, Utah Code Ann. 58-
37-8 (2)(a)(I), 1953. Maycock was also charged with driving 
under the influence of drugs in violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-6-
44, 1953 and possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to Utah 
Code Ann. 41-6-44, 1953. The charge of driving under the 
influence of drugs was dropped prior to trial. ..< 
At a trial held in the Fourth Judicial District Court for 
Juab County, State of Utah on January 10th, 1992, the following 
facts were revealed: 
On November 24th, 1995, at approximately 9:20 a.m., Maycock 
was driving his vehicle, a white Toyota pickup with a shell on 
it, near milepost 217 on Interstate 15 (T at 10, 48)1. Maycock 
i The statement of facts is taken form the trial transcript and the preliminary hearing transcript. Pages of the trial 
transcript are cited herein as i%(T.)." . 
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was the sole occupant of the vehicle. 
Swain was also traveling on 1-15 on November 24th, 1994, at 
approximately the same time and location as Maycock (T at 10). 
Swain stopped Maycock for not having a license plate on the front 
bumper of his vehicle (T at 10). Swain approached the driver's 
side of the vehicle and requested Maycockfs driver's license and 
registration (T at 10). When Maycock rolled down his window and 
gave Swain his drivers license and registration, Swain alleges 
that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside 
the vehicle (T at 10). Swain received Maycockfs driver's license 
and registration and asked Maycock to exit the vehicle (T at 12) . 
A later check of the vehicle's registration determined that the 
car was registered to Jarvis Maycock. Swain requested that he 
be allowed to search the vehicle. Maycock said no (T at 13). 
Swain proceeded to search the vehicle because, he said, "I could 
smell marijuana" (T at 12, 2 6). 
During his search of the vehicle, Swain first found a bottle 
of Visine in the driver's side door pouch. (T at 27). As Swain 
was searching the vehicle, Maycock remarked that he was cold and 
asked if he could sit in the vehicle. Swain said he did not want 
Maycock in the vehicle "for safety reasons" and asked him if he 
would like a jacket. Maycock said yes and before handing Maycock 
a jacket that was lying on the passenger seat, Swain searched the 
jacket. Next Swain found a film container and the casing of a pen 
with the end cut off which Swain described as a "snorting tube" 
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(T at 27, 28). On the edge of the snorting tube, Swain believes 
he observed an unidentified orange substance. Next, Swain found 
in the jacket a razor blade, a clip, and a red pipe with what he 
believed was marijuana residue inside (T at 30, 31). This belief 
was never confirmed by a lab analysis of the pipe. The film 
container found in the jacket pocket contained two small rocks of 
what a Trooper swain believed to be methamphetamine. A lab 
analysis of the substance at the State Crime Lab confirmed that 
the substance was approximately 130 milligrams of 
methamphetamine. (T at 36) . 
When Trooper Swain asked Maycock about the contents of the 
jacket, Maycock replied that the jacket was not his and that it 
belonged to a person named Kelly Ebell (T at 37, 38) . Maycock 
said that he did not know the phone number or address of the 
person (T. at 37). 
Swain then handcuffed Maycock and placed him in his patrol 
car and then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. The 
search revealed no other incriminating items. Swain then 
transported Maycock to the Juab county jail where he was booked 
(T. at 40). 
After arguments by defense counsel, the trial court denied 
Maycockfs motion to suppress (T. at 25). Then, on June 26, 1995, 
Maycock was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia as stated above. 
On July 16, 1995, Maycock was sentenced on Count I to the 
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Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5 
years, plus pay a fine in the amount of $5,ooo; and on Count II 
to the Juab County Jail for six (6) months. Execution of the 
sentence was suspended and Maycock was placed on probation for a 
period of 36 months. Thereafter, Maycock filed a timely notice 
of appeal on October 10th, 1995. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The warrantless search of Maycock1s vehicle was conducted 
without probable cause and was not justified by exigent 
circumstances as required by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. The warrantless search was not supported by 
probable cause because it did not reveal any evidence to 
corroborate Swain's assertion that he smelled burnt marijuana 
emanating from Maycock1s vehicle. Additionally, the search was 
not justified by exigent circumstances because Swain could have 
obtained a telephonic search warrant with relative ease but chose 
not to do so. Furthermore, the inevitable discovery doctrine 
will not allow admission of the evidence because no impoundment 
or inventory search would have been conducted but for the illegal 
search of the vehicle and any subsequent inventory search is 
therefore tainted by the preceding constitutional violation. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. 
Wherefore, Maycock urges this court to reverse the trial court's 
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denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SWAIN LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
SEARCH BECAUSE THE VEHICLE DID NOT CONTAIN MARIJUANA AS 
ALLEGED BY THE OFFICER AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS SITUATION. 
A. Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 
this court accords no deference to the trial courts legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. Beavers, 
859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993). However, this court will 
disturb the trial court's factual findings only if clearly 
erroneous. Id. 
B. Erroneous Finding and Conclusion on Probable Cause Requires 
Reversal. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that all searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant 
based on probable cause. See U.S. Const, amend. IV. A 
warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the government 
shows that the search falls within a recognized exception such as 
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valid consent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 
(1971). "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is 
basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, (1984). 
To give effect to the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and to deter illegal police 
conduct, the court must apply the exclusionary rule and suppress 
any evidence unconstitutionally obtained. Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431, (1984). The government has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search meets the 
requirements of an exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge 
403 U.S. 443 at 455. 
The trial court found that probable cause existed to search 
Maycock's car based solely upon Swain's testimony that he smelled 
an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car after he 
stopped Maycock for failing to display a license plate on the -
front of his car. The issue of whether or not an officer of the 
law has probable cause to search a vehicle based solely upon the 
alleged smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle after the 
vehicle has been lawfully stopped is not a novel one. 
This court addressed precisely the same issue in State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In that case, 
after stopping the defendant for a traffic violation, the officer 
involved testified that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana 
emanating from the defendant's car. He then searched and found a 
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who might seek to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment by claiming to smell marijuana as the basis to conduct 
a warrantless search when in fact no such smell of marijuana 
existed and the assertion was falsely made as a pretext to 
justify a warrantless search. 
To hold that the warrantless search of a vehicle based on 
the alleged smell of marijuana emanating from that vehicle is 
lawful even in the absence of any corroborating evidence revealed 
by the search would be to set a dangerous precedent endangering 
the principles for which the Fourth Amendment stands - "The 
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to 
a free society" Wolf 338 U.S. 25 at 27. 
This court is not alone in it's concern that the Fourth 
Amendment would be endangered if no corroboration were required 
to justify a warrantless search based solely on the alleged smell 
of marijuana. In United States v. Nielsen 9 f.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 
1993), the Circuit Court invalidated the search and seizure of 
evidence in the trunk of the appellant's car. In that case, a 
search of the passenger area of the car based solely on the 
trooper's alleged smell of burnt marijuana emanating from that 
area revealed no marijuana to corroborate the Trooper's 
assertion. Nonetheless, the Trooper searched the trunk of the 
appellant's car against his will and discovered cocaine. The 
court reasoned that although the smell of burnt marijuana might 
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lead to a belief that the passenger compartment contained 
marijuana, a search of that area had not revealed any marijuana 
and that under the circumstances there was no fair probability 
that the trunk contained marijuana, _Id at 1491. 
In it's discussion of whether the alleged smell of marijuana 
is sufficient to support probable cause to conduct a warrantless 
search of a vehicle, the court noted: 
We have made unqualified statements that the smell of marijuana is 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search. In all of the cases in 
our circuit however, the search itself established the validity of the 
smell. In all of the searches pursuant to the smell, marijuana was 
found in the area it would be expected to be found. The case before us 
is the first in which there was no corroboration of the smell. If this 
were a case of an alert by a trained drug sniffing dog with a good 
record, we would not require corroboration to establish probable cause, 
The dog would have no reason to make a false alert. But for a human 
sniffer, an officer with an incentive to find illegal activities and to 
justify his actions when he had searched without consent, we believe 
constitutional rights are endangered when limitations are not imposed. 
Id. 
To hold that Swain's alleged smell of burnt marijuana 
provided probable cause to search the vehicle even though the 
search revealed no corroborating evidence would jeopardize the 
constitutional protections that the court expressed concern about 
in Nielsen and "would open the door to snooping and rummaging 
through personal effects. Even a most acute sense of smell might 
mislead officers into fruitless invasions of privacy where no 
contraband is found." People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 
1968). 
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Most importantly however, to hold that Swain1s warrantless 
search based on the alleged smell of marijuana was lawful in the 
absence of any corroborating evidence of marijuana revealed by 
the search would be to encourage arbitrary, warrantless 
intrusions into the privacy of citizens by the police. Because 
Swain's warrantless search of appellant's vehicle based on the 
alleged odor of burnt marijuana revealed no evidence to 
corroborate Swain's assertion, the search was conducted without 
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the 
evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
The trial court erroneously sustained the search under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine on the theory that the car would 
have been impounded and the evidence revealed during an inventory 
search. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1101, vehicles operated 
with improper registration may be impounded. In the instant case 
however, the trial record reflects no testimony by Trooper Swain 
that the vehicle was improperly registered. Swain testified that 
he stopped the appellant because no license plate was displayed 
on the front of his car (T. 10). Swain then testified that he 
asked to see the appellant's drivers license and registration (T. 
12). The testimony regarding Swain's verification of the 
vehicles registration is as follows: 
Q: Okay. What did you do next? 
A: Well, I got his drivers license and registration and I asked 
Mr. Maycock to exit the vehicle. 
Q: Did you look at the registration at that time? 
A: I don't remember. 
Q: Did you have a chance to look at it later on? 
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A: I'm sure I did. 
Q: Who was the vehicle registered to? 
A: To Mr. Jarvis Maycock 
(P.H. at 6)2 
The testimony of trooper Swain does not indicate that there 
was any defect in the vehicle's registration. Indeed, it 
indicates that the vehicle was validly registered to the 
appellant. Utah Code Ann. 41-la-404 requires that vehicles must 
display license plates in the front and back of the vehicle. The 
statute does not state that a vehicle may be impounded if a 
license plate is missing. Neither does Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1101 
indicate that a missing license plate is a defect in registration 
of a vehicle. Moreover, the trial record reflects no testimony 
by trooper Swain that a missing front license plate provided any 
basis to impound the vehicle. 
While a front license plate on the appellant's vehicle was 
not displayed, Swain's testimony indicates that the vehicle was 
properly registered to the appellant and a missing license plate 
should be construed merely as a defect in display rather than a 
defect in the vehicle's registration allowing impoundment of the 
vehicle. 
2 "(P.R )" indicates preliminary hearing transcript. 
13 
Finally, the trial record reflects no testimony by Trooper 
Swain regarding whether he would have impounded the car, nor 
regarding any procedure or policy that would have governed an 
impoundment and inventory search. 
Because there is no evidentiary basis to support the 
conclusions of the trial court, and because no inventory of 
appellant's vehicle would have occurred but for the illegal 
search, the evidence cannot be admissible under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984)(discussing inevitable discovery doctrine). 
In United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1408-1409 (10th 
Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that 
evidence seized during an invalid impound search was not 
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because but 
for the unlawful impound, no inventory search would have 
occurred. 
The instant case presents a situation which is substantially 
similar and equally as problematic. As discussed above, the 
warrantless search of appellant's vehicle violated the Fourth 
Amendment and the evidence it revealed must be suppressed. It is 
also clear that no impound or inventory search of appellant's 
vehicle would have been conducted but for the illegal search. It 
follows that any inventory search of the vehicle would be tainted 
by the Fourth Amendment violation and the inevitable discovery 
doctrine cannot operate to remove the taint. 
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In order to be justified, an inventory search must comply 
with standard police procedures and not exceed the bounds of a 
normal inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367; 
United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 636-637 (10th Cir. 1992); 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988). No testimony 
has been offered to show what procedure is followed by the Utah 
Highway Patrol with respect to inventory searches or even to 
establish that a set of procedures exists. Moreover, no evidence 
has been offered that the Utah Highway patrol follows a procedure 
of taking an inventory of the pockets of an article of clothing 
found in a search as opposed to simply recording an inventory of 
the article of clothing itself. 
Because the state has failed to prove that an inventory 
search would have revealed the evidence, it cannot rely on the 
inevitable discovery doctrine to allow admission of the evidence. 
See State v.Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995)(requiring 
government to show "established reasonable procedure for 
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents and that the 
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance with 
that procedure" in order to justify search as inventory search 
under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S 364 (1976) . 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED 
TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
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A. Standard of review 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 
this court accords no deference to the trial courts legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. Beavers, 
859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993). However, this court will 
disturb the trial court's factual findings only if clearly 
erroneous. Id. 
B. Lack of exigent circumstances needed to conduct warrantless 
search requires reversal 
Assuming arguendo that the search of appellant's vehicle was 
supported by probable cause, the search was still invalid because 
no exigent circumstances existed to justify the search. 
Therefore, any evidence obtained must be suppressed. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted Article 1, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution as providing Utah citizens with more 
protection against warrantless search and seizure than the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470-471 (Utah 1990) (requiring both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless 
search of a vehicle. Search of automobile parked in front of 
home was invalidated because no exigent circumstances existed to 
justify warrantless search). In basing it's decision on the 
16 
state Constitution, the court reasoned: 
..the high degree of government regulation does not support the excessive diminution 
of Fourth Amendment protection of the automobile which accompanies application of the 
automobile exception. 
^d. at 469. 
In determining that a warrantless search was not justified, 
the court relied on the ease with which a telephonic warrant may 
be obtained in Utah: 
Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant, Utah has 
adopted a procedure whereby warrants may be issued over the telephone. Section 77-
23-4(2)3 of the Utah code allows for the issuance of a search warrant based on the 
sworn telephonic statement of the officer seeking the warrant, provided that the 
statement is properly recorded and transcribed. 
Id. at 470. 
The reasoning of the court in Larocco is no less persuasive 
in the instant case. Moreover, it seems clear that the Utah 
legislature provided a mechanism for obtaining telephonic search 
warrants in order to discourage warrantless searches by making it 
easier for police to obtain search warrants in situations such as 
3 Utah Code Ann.77-23-4 (2) 3 ha s been renumbered t o Utah Code Ann. 7 7 - 2 3 - 2 0 4 . 
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roadside vehicle stops where warrants were previously difficult 
to obtain. 
In the instant case, Trooper Swain testified that his radio 
did not have the capability of being patched through to court 
officers or judges who might have granted a search warrant (T. 
16). While this assertion is questionable at best, it seems 
clear that Swain could have called his dispatch and had a sworn 
statement recorded or transcribed by someone of authority there 
who could then contact a judge or court officer and obtain a 
search warrant. See Utah Code Ann. 77-23-204 (The sworn oral 
testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by telephone or 
other appropriate means...). In the alternative, Swain could 
have radioed for another Highway Patrol officer to secure 
appellant's vehicle while Swain drove to a phone and obtained a 
warrant telephonically. 
As this court noted in a recent case: 
..the need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so 
strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided 
by the warrant requirement. 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) . 
This court has also stated: . 
We must first clarify that the plain view doctrine and its corollary "plain 
smell" theory do not in and of themselves provide an exception to the 
requirement of obtaining a valid search warrant. 
18 
State v. South/ 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) . 
The instant case does not present a situation in which 
exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search of appellant's 
vehicle. Trooper Swain had the ability to obtain a search 
warrant telephonically with relative ease and simply chose not to 
do so. See State v. Palmer, 67 6 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(warrantless search of defendant's body by X-ray because 
police believed he had swallowed a diamond ring was held invalid 
where officers could have obtained a telephonic search warrant 
with relative ease and failed to do so). 
Based on the foregoing, evidence seized from Maycock's 
vehicle should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in holding that the warrantless search 
of Maycock's vehicle, which was conducted without probable cause 
or justified by exigent circumstances, did not violate the 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. As such, the trial 
court erroneously denied Maycock's motion to suppress the 
evidence and his conviction should therefore be reversed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
19 
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues 
presented are novel, and oral argument will aid the Court in 
disposing of them. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this-^^"of January, 1996. 
STANLEY S. ADAMS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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General, at 160 East 300 South, Suite 600, P.O. Box# 140854, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111. 
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